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A research project at the University of 
East Anglia and University of Sussex The Governance of Clean Development: CDM and Beyond 
Governing Clean Development: 
what have we learnt? 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) forms a key part of the international community’s attempt to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but continues to fall short on its promise to provide sustainable development 
benefits in developing countries. Research by the Governance of Clean Development Project suggests that 
current reform agendas will do little to rectify this unless important aspects of the politics and governance of 
clean development are addressed. This briefing outlines the need to change the political relationships that 
determine who benefits from the CDM, which go beyond reducing market transaction costs or overhauling 
the formal institutions of CDM governance. Policies are required that recognise these challenges and create 
opportunities to drive significant changes in how governance works for both climate and development.
Key Messages 
 Strong and effective institutions 
from local to international level are 
required to steer the CDM toward 
climate and development goals. 
 Local communities and the public 
have few opportunities to directly 
engage with CDM procedures and 
little political influence over CDM 
policy. Access to information is not 
the same as representation. 
 The potential of the CDM to reach 
citizens bypassed by other forms of 
finance can be enhanced by aligning 
the CDM with national policies and 
coordinated donor initiatives. 
 The political barriers to the uptake 
of clean technologies run deeper 
than carbon markets and the scope of 
technocratic reform programs. Wider 
political changes are required. 
Good Governance and Beyond 
2. The Good Governance of Carbon 
Markets: There is a real danger that, 
left to its own devices, the CDM could 
become a ‘rich man’s club’ of project 
devel opers, emissions verifiers and 
government officials in roles that overlap 
and rotate so frequently that any notion of 
independence and transparency is tested 
to the limit. Our research has found many 
examples of a revolving door between 
officials in Designated National Authorities 
(DNAs), project developers and verifiers – 
some even occupying more than one role 
at the same time. While most countries 
now have a DNA to approve and oversee 
CDM projects, few of them operate in a 
transparent and predictable way, many 
stand accused of collusion with project 
developers and their own accountability 
1. Clean Development Governance: it’s 
broken and it needs fixing. The CDM 
Executive Board has been he main focus 
of discussions about CDM governance. 
However, without stronger and more 
effective forms of governance from a 
range of institutions from local to the 
international level, the CDM and other 
forms of carbon finance can never form the 
basis of an effective response to climate 
change nor serve as a powerful vehicle to 
promote sustainable development. Strong, 
independent and credible institutions 
are required to address corruption in 
carbon markets, to properly assess project 
applications, to ensure that social benefits 
are forthcoming, and that the intended 
beneficiaries of these are involved in 
decision-making.
The Governance of Clean Development: CDM and Beyond
 Who makes the rules and who takes the decisions has a 
strong bearing on who benefits 
 Governance processes at 
the local level have been almost 
entirely neglected 
and redress mechanisms are often either 
weak or non-existent. 
3. Don’t forget the Local: Governance 
challenges at the local level have been almost 
entirely neglected. Yet local consultations 
and policy-processes provide the most 
common means for poorer groups (the 
supposed beneficiaries of many CDM 
projects) to engage with the CDM. Our 
research reveals many shortcomings in this 
process that urgently need to be addressed. 
Often announcements about consultations 
are placed in obscure media in non-native 
languages which are inaccessible for many 
people. Lack of transparency and monitoring 
can also be to the detriment of project 
developers who find hearings hijacked by local 
officials wanting a bribe in return for support 
for the project. Many local institutions – such 
as Panchayats in India – exist that could be 
used more effectively to identify projects for 
social benefits and impacts. 
Governance and Politics: 
Business as Unusual 
4. Whose rules rule? There is a strong link 
between procedure and distribution: who 
makes the rules and who takes the decisions 
has a strong bearing on who benefits. It is 
not realistic to expect all potentially affected 
stakeholders to participate in all decisions 
all of the time; but public engagement 
in a process to establish overall sectoral 
and financing priorities for the country 
around energy, transport, agriculture and 
other sectors could form the basis of a 
proactive CDM policy to enable forms of 
investment identified as positive, progressive 
and beneficial to the majority of people. 
Developers would then be required to show 
clearly how they contribute to national goals 
and strategies over which there is a greater 
sense of popular ownership. 
5. Power tools: There are many governance 
tools that governments can use to maximise 
the benefits they and their citizens receive 
from the CDM. These may include taxation or 
the application of wide-ranging sustainable 
development criteria. How ever, in practice, 
only more powerful governments can make 
use of them. 
6. Politics, not just governance: Any 
amount of technocratic governance reform 
of procedures and institutions won’t alter 
the fact that the politics have to change. 
Responding to climate change and poverty 
simultaneously means forming coalitions 
of actors with enough political power to 
overcome the resistance of ‘incumbent’ 
actors that depend on fossil fuels and often 
Local institutions could be better utilised to increase local participation 
in CDM consultations and project design.
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The Governance of Clean Development: CDM and Beyond
Carbon-intensive industries have not been subject to the 
disincentives that are required alongside incentives for clean energy. 
Rather, many have received additional support from the CDM, at the 
expense of clean technologies.
 A key 
question is how  
the CDM can  
enhance other  
policies and 
interventions  
to re-direct  
carbon intensive 
finance 
receive high levels of state support to remain 
profitable. The CDM is currently neither large 
enough nor profitable enough to change the 
commercial or political strategic calculus of 
large corporations (public and private) whose 
behaviour most needs to change. 
Steering, aligning and 
adding value 
7. As a driver of change in and of itself the 
CDM has minimal power. Irrespective of 
market size and the future price of carbon, 
CDM projects and finance have to be aligned 
with other funding streams and policy 
initiatives in order to make a difference. The 
question is how the value of the CDM can be 
enhanced by other policies and interventions. 
In India, for example, there is interest in how 
the CDM can be connected to a Renewable 
Energy Certificate trading scheme or aligned 
with the country’s National Solar Mission. 
Governments need to be aware of the 
opportunities in forging such connections, 
and be clear about where the CDM can 
complement national initiatives. 
8. The potential of the CDM lies in reaching 
sectors, regions and people that are unlikely 
to otherwise benefit from carbon finance. 
This must occur as part of a coordinated and 
multi-pronged strategy to support low carbon 
development. Since World Bank and UNFCCC 
climate finance is increasingly available for 
larger infrastructural projects and upgrades, 
CDM finance needs to maximise sustainable 
development benefits for the poor. Donor 
agencies such as DfID and GIZ have been 
playing a role in identifying and promoting 
CDM eligible projects with strong poverty 
reduction elements in India and South Africa. 
In Argentina, however, support for scaling up 
the World Bank programmes for renewable 
energy in rural areas, has not been integrated 
with efforts to attract carbon finance. 
9. Donors have a clear role to play here 
but greater levels of coordination among 
them are required. This can ensure that 
interventions to support pro-poor CDM 
projects add value and are effective. With 
strong competition between donors to brand 
their own interventions and manage the large 
sums of money available in the area of climate 
change and development, cooperation and 
coordination to ensure that the greatest 
benefit is brought to the largest number of 
people often falls by the wayside. Given the 
challenges, an international climate finance 
summit may be in order to agree priorities 
and a workable division of labour among the 
many actors now operating in the area of 
climate finance and carbon markets. 
Dealing with Blind Spots 
10. From out of the shadows: In terms of 
making a serious contribution to tackling 
climate change, the CDM’s role will remain 
minimal unless the day to day flows of finance 
in the energy, transport and other emissions-
intensive sectors are subject to stronger 
forms of governance and regulation to steer 
them into low carbon forms of development. 
11. Propping up Business as Usual: Our 
research has found plenty of evidence that 
CDM finance is seen as a useful extra revenue 
stream for large corporations keen to prop 
up existing investments in fossil fuels. In 
India Tata and Reliance are among the key 
players while in South Africa Sasol and Eskom 
are looking to carbon markets to support 
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The Governance of Clean Development: CDM and Beyond
 Technocratic 
governance reform 
of procedures and 
institutions won’t 
alter the fact that 
the politics have  
to change 
their core business. This is undermining the 
credibility of the CDM by prolonging the 
life of the very industries that most need to 
transition to a lower carbon economy. Even 
if a case for such support can be made in the 
volume of emissions reductions achieved, 
other forms of transition support can be 
provided. Support to fossil fuel industries is 
not an appropriate use of CDM finance when 
projects with strong environmental and 
social credentials are vying for attention. 
12. These challenges won’t go away. 
Indeed, if anything they will be intensified 
if Programmatic CDM and proposals for 
Sectoral or Policy-based CDM develop 
further, and as demand increases for projects 
from least developed countries. Politically 
engaged governance reform is not a luxury 
but a pre-requisite if carbon markets are to 
make an effective contribution to tackling 
climate change and promoting sustainable 
development: the mandate they were given 
nearly fifteen years ago. 
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This briefing is based on the findings of a 
3 year study into the Governance of Clean 
Development: CDM and Beyond, at the 
University of East Anglia, UK, funded by the 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). 
The project has analysed clean development 
governance in India, South Africa and Argentina, 
including the governance of the CDM and 
of other public and private institutions and 
mechanisms that govern clean development.
A range of project publications and dissemination 
materials are available online: 
The Governance of Clean Development Project 
www.clean-development.com
Improvements in the efficiency of home cooking promise both savings in greenhouse gas emissions and 
benefits to households. Governance lessons from the past concerning top-down ‘roll-out’ of technologies 
must be learnt if carbon market programmes are to avoid repeating previous mistakes.
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